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PURE CONFUSION: SHOULD PURE LICENSORS
SHARE THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY OF
MANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS OF
DANGEROUSLY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS?
INTRODUCTION
Among the legal landscapes that have been subject to confusion in
the last century, one of the murkiest is the overlap between the fields
of trademark licensing and products liability. Trademarks were origi-
nally conceptualized as a means for consumers to identify the physical
source of goods.' This identification allowed consumers to rely on
their prior experiences to form expectations of quality.2 As such,
trademarks were not licensable because they would cease to identify
the true source of goods.3 Over time, it became evident that consum-
ers did not care about the actual source of goods, but merely the con-
sistent quality of those goods.4 At the same time, the emergence of
industrialization and independent manufacturers made clear that the
ability to license trademarks would enable businesses to outsource
production and retain an established customer base.5 These changes
led to the legal acceptance of trademark licensing.6
Before the emergence of products liability, injured consumers were
forced to seek compensation under either breach of warranty or sim-
ple negligence.7 However, just as the industrialization of America
rendered anachronistic the traditional view of trademarks as nonlicen-
sable, so too did these causes of action prove to be insufficient to al-
low injured consumers a method of recovery. The inclusion of strict
1. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:8
(4th ed. 2011).
2. Id. § 3:2.
3. Id. § 18:39.
4. Holly Piehler Rockwell, Annotation, Trademark Licensor's Liability for Injury or Death
Allegedly Due to Defect in Licensed Product, 90 A.L.R. 4th 981, 986 (1991).
5. See Jennifer Rudis Deschamp, Comment, Has the Law of Products Liability Spoiled the
True Purpose of Trademark Licensing? Analyzing the Responsibility of a Trademark Licensor
for Defective Products Bearing Its Mark, 25 Sr. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 247, 250 (2006)
("[Blusinesses could license an established trademark for the design of a product and then out-
source the manufacturing of that product to another company.").
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
7. Melissa Evans Buss, Products Liability and Intellectual Property Licensors, 27 Wm. MrrcH-
ELL L. REv. 299, 301-05 (2000).
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liability within products liability allowed consumers to recover against
manufacturers with whom they were not in privity and against sellers
of defective goods who were not involved in the manufacture of those
goods.8
As the field of products liability has expanded to include more po-
tential defendants and plaintiffs and the field of trademark licensing
has grown into a huge industry,9 the two fields have inevitably over-
lapped. Unfortunately, a uniform approach to this overlap has never
been established.10 Some courts hold that licensors must be substan-
tially involved in the design, manufacture, or distribution of a defec-
tive product to be held liable as an apparent manufacturer." Others
hold that the mere act of licensing a trademark is sufficient to warrant
treatment of the licensor as an apparent manufacturer.12
The lack of a unified approach to the products liability of trademark
licensors can be remedied by an analysis of the factual bases and pol-
icy underpinnings of these two seemingly disparate areas of law. Part
II of this Comment examines the development of both trademark li-
censing and products liability.' 3 It then discusses the inevitable over-
lap of these two fields of law and describes different approaches taken
by courts when applying products liability to trademark licensors.14
Next, Part III argues that a pure trademark licensor should be held
strictly liable for defective products bearing its trademark, just as sell-
ers and manufacturers are held liable.15 Finally, Part IV discusses the
potential impacts of such an approach.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of Trademark Licensing
The propriety of trademark licensing has changed significantly over
the last century because of the change in the perceived purposes of
trademarks. Historically, the recognition of trademark rights has been
justified as protecting both the consumer and the trademark owner.' 7
8. See id. at 301-03.
9. See id. at 302.
10. See Deschamp, supra note 5, at 250-51.
11. See, e.g., Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322-23, 334 (Ct. App. 1972).
12. See, e.g., Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 162-63 (Ill. 1979).
13. See infra notes 17-62 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 63-134 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
17. S. REP. No. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580 ("Trademark
law protects the public by making consumers confident that they can identify brands they prefer
and can purchase those brands without being confused or misled. . . . When the owner of a
[Vol. 61:697698
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Due to the former justification, trademarks were not the transferrable,
licensable property we know today.18 Courts maintained that when
the public becomes familiar with a trademark and relies on its desig-
nation of quality, affixing that trademark to a different product "be-
comes a false and deceitful designation."19 Thus, trademarks could
not be transferred without also transferring the trademark owner's en-
tire manufacturing operation; to allow otherwise would subject the
public to fraud and deception, which would be "totally inconsistent
with the theory upon which the value of a trade-mark depends and its
appropriation by an individual is permitted."20
With the onset of the industrial revolution and the subsequent mass
production of goods, it became evident that the ability to license
trademarks would be a boon to the manufacturing industries. 21 Fur-
ther, it became clear that the public was not concerned about the iden-
tity of the actual producer of a given good as long as the good was of
an expected quality.22 Congress recognized as much by permitting the
assignment of marks in the Lanham Act: "A registered mark or a
mark for which an application to register has been filed shall be as-
signable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used
"23
Today, trademarks no longer serve only the narrow function of
identifying the physical source of products; they also serve "as indica-
tions of consistent and predictable quality assured through the trade-
mark owner's control over the use of the designation." 2 4 To ensure
that the product is of a consistent and predictable quality, the Lanham
Act permits a trademark owner to license its trademark to a licensee
that is a related company.25 The Act defines a related company as
''any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the
mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on
or in connection with which the mark is used." 26 Should a licensor fail
trademark has spent considerable time and money bringing a product to the marketplace, trade-
mark law protects the producer from pirates and counterfeiters.").
18. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:8.
19. Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1901).
20. Id.
21. Deschamp, supra note 5, at 250.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. a (1995) ("The narrow con-
ception of trademarks as indications of physical source was eventually replaced by a recognition
that trademarks may signify other connections between goods bearing the mark and the trade-
mark owner, including the trademark owner's approval or sponsorship of the goods.").
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2006).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. a (1995).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1055.
26. Id. § 1127.
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to exercise the mandated control over the nature or quality of the
goods, the licensor risks forfeiture-the loss of the legal right to exclu-
sive use-of the trademark. 27 However, because the Act fails to spec-
ify what constitutes the necessary amount of control, courts have
addressed the issue based on the facts of each case.28 Generally,
though, courts are disinclined to find that a licensor has failed to exer-
cise the requisite control.29
B. The Evolution of Products Liability
Just as the industrialization of America led to the recognition of
trademarks as transferrable property, so too did it lead to the birth of
strict products liability.30 Strict products liability has been justified on
several grounds, most notably (1) its ability to spread the cost of inju-
ries among those who reap the benefits and can more readily bear the
cost 31 and (2) its ability to encourage the production of goods with
fewer defects.32 That there was a need to satisfy these two public pol-
icy needs is clear when considering the evolution of strict products
liability from negligence.
To prevail under a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must show that
he suffered an injury that was caused by the defendant's breach of
duty it owed to the plaintiff.33 In cases in which the plaintiff is injured
by a defective product that he purchased from the defendant, a duty is
imposed on the defendant seller through contract law; specifically, an
implied warranty of merchantability.34 Under this warranty, the seller
implicitly guarantees that the product is merchantable, or fit for its
27. John W. Behringer & Monica A. Otte, Liability and the Trademark Licensor: Advice for
the Franchisor of Goods or Services, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 109, 111 (1981) ("The statutory sanction
for failing . . . [to exercise control] is loss of the exclusive right to use the trademark.").
28. Generally, licensors have an affirmative duty to monitor the activities of their licensees
with respect to their trademark. Id.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. c (1995) ("As a general mat-
ter, courts are reluctant to interfere with the marketing arrangements adopted by trademark
owners, and minimal control over the quality of a licensee's goods or services is often sufficient
to satisfy the requirement imposed under this Section.").
30. See Buss, supra note 7, at 301.
31. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962).
32. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODucrs LIABILITY 8 (3d ed. 1997).
In addition to these justifications, there are other, less frequently noted justifications for prod-
ucts liability, such as "enterprise liability, ... practicality, and implied representation." See Gary
Highland, Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
805, 811 (1979).
33. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 170 (9th ed. 2008).
34. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2010).
700 [Vol. 61:697
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purpose, by selling the product.35 Thus, if a consumer purchases a
good and it proves to be defective, the consumer has a tort remedy
under a breach of contract theory; however, until the middle of the
twentieth century, a plaintiff seeking such relief was required to show
the existence of privity of contract between the parties.36 The con-
straints of privity were finally eliminated in the landmark case
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 37
In MacPherson, a motorist was injured when a wooden spoke in the
wheel of his Buick car shattered.38 The motorist brought a negligence
claim against Buick.39 Buick did not itself manufacture the wheels,
nor did it sell the vehicle directly to the motorist.40 Rather, Buick
purchased the wheels from a separate entity and sold the vehicle
through a dealer.41 Traditionally, the requirement of privity would
have left the motorist without a remedy as against Buick, but Judge
Cardozo eliminated the privity requirement, stating:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger.... [I]rrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing
of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.... [W]here danger is
to be foreseen, a liability will follow. 42
Even without the strictures of privity, the requirement that a plain-
tiff prove the breach of a duty owed to it by the defendant often
barred injured consumers from recovering under a negligence theory.
In Justice Traynor's famous concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., he argued that strict liability principles should govern manu-
facturer liability, not negligence principles.43
In Escola, a waitress was storing bottles of Coca Cola in a refrigera-
tor when one of the bottles exploded, causing serious injuries to her
hand." The waitress brought a negligence claim against the bottling
35. Id. The warranty exists only "if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind." Id.
36. HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 32, at 8 ("[Alnyone not in 'privity of contract' with
the supplier could not recover for the supplier's negligence no matter how directly and
foreseeably his injuries were causally linked to that negligence.").
37. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).




42. Id. at 1053.
43. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
44. Id. at 437-38 (majority opinion).
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company, relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.4 5 The court held
that the waitress had presented evidence sufficient for the jury to find
that the bottling company was negligent.46
Justice Traynor, concurring in the judgment, concluded that in cases
such as this, strict liability should serve as the basis for liability, not
negligence. 4 7 Justice Traynor presented several public policy consider-
ations that have since served as the basis for strict products liability.
He argued that manufacturers are best able to inspect and prevent
dangerous defects in their own products.4 8 He also maintained that
with the benefits of mass production of goods comes the risk that
some of those goods will be dangerously defective and that under just
considerations of cost allocation, it would be unfair to expect individu-
als to bear the cost of those risks.4 9 Finally, Justice Traynor argued
that administrative efficiency and simplification of the law demand
that strict liability supplant the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in prod-
ucts liability cases.5 0
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., Justice Traynor got his
wish. A consumer was injured when he was struck by a piece of wood
that flew out of a lathe he had purchased from a retailer.5 1 In holding
the manufacturer of the lathe liable for the consumer's injuries, Justice
Traynor established the doctrine of strict products liability as a distinct
remedy in tort, separate from breach of warranty or simple negli-
45. Id. at 438. "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-literally, Latin for 'the thing speaks for
itself-has frequently been invoked when the plaintiff seeks to establish the defendant's negli-
gence by circumstantial evidence." EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 299.
46. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440.
47. Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring) ("I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no
longer be singled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the present one. In
my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.").
48. Id. at 440-41 ("[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the
recurrence of others, as the public cannot.").
49. Id. at 441 ("The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.").
50. See id.
In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless
of the evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability. It is
needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in
reality liability without negligence. If public policy demands that a manufacturer of
goods be responsible for their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not to
fix that responsibility openly.
Id.
51. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 898 (Cal. 1962).
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gence.52 After Greenman, the American Law Institute promulgated
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which makes sellers of
defective products strictly liable as if they were manufacturers.53
For the purposes of this Comment, it is also important to briefly
discuss § 400 of the Restatement (Second), which sets forth the appar-
ent manufacturer doctrine. Unlike § 402A, which established a re-
gime of strict liability for sellers, § 400 and the rules that it
incorporated by reference "establish[ed] a regime of fault-based man-
ufacturers' liability." 54
Under the apparent manufacturer doctrine, a nonmanufacturing
seller of a defective product is liable as a manufacturer.55 While this
doctrine can be amply supported under theories of economic effi-
ciency, 56 some courts have justified it under a theory of estoppel by
focusing on the seller's conduct in causing the public to believe that it
was the manufacturer.57 However, resorting to this justification un-
necessarily reifies the fault-based roots of the apparent manufacturer
doctrine.5
The apparent manufacturer doctrine has been rendered largely un-
necessary with the inclusion of § 402A in the Restatement (Second),
52. Id. at 900-01.
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, know-
ing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being....
Although . . . strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of
the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not
assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer
to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products make clear that the
liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict
liability in tort.
Id. (citations omitted).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Buss, supra note 7, at
301-02.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 14 cmt. a (1997).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965) ("One who puts out as his own product a
chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufac-
turer."); David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the
Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 671, 693 (1999).
56. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
57. See Franklyn, supra note 55, at 693.
58. When liability turns on whether the defendant led the plaintiff to believe that the defen-
dant was the manufacturer of the product, the issue is whether the defendant should be estopped
from denying liability as a manufacturer because of its misleading representations. However,
strict liability analysis does not make equitable assessments of a defendant's conduct, but rather
asks only whether the plaintiff is a seller. When a court injects the equitable doctrine of estoppel
into a strict liability analysis it brings into play the very issue of fault that strict liability eschews.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
which has essentially subsumed § 400.59 Section 402A differs from the
apparent manufacturer doctrine in that the former eschews any re-
quirement that the seller hold itself out as the manufacturer and re-
quires only that the seller has sold a "product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."60 While § 400
finds a seller liable by treating him as a proxy for the manufacturer,
§ 402A avoids this fiction and makes a seller directly liable, regardless
of appearances or consumer assumptions as to the source of the
goods. 61
With the inclusion of § 402A, it has become questionable whether
there is any life left in the apparent manufacturer doctrine. 62 After
all, if a seller is strictly liable for any defective products it sells, it is
irrelevant whether the seller appeared to be the manufacturer.
Whether § 400 serves any remaining purpose depends on its interpre-
tation. As discussed below, courts have interpreted the provision
loosely to apply the section to trademark licensors.
C. Overlap of Trademark Licensing and Products Liability
As products liability expanded the universe of both proper defend-
ants and plaintiffs, the overlap between the areas of trademark licens-
ing and products liability became inevitable. Products liability began
by applying to manufacturer-sellers, but it expanded up the chain of
commerce to manufacturer-nonsellers and then expanded sideways to
include nonmanufacturer-sellers. Similarly, the broadening scope of
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
After inclusion of § 402A in the Restatement, Second, imposing strict liability on all
commercial sellers of defective products for harm caused by product defects, it was
questionable whether § 400 remained relevant in the context of products liability.
Once § 402A imposed strict liability on all product sellers it made little, if any, differ-
ence whether the seller of a defective product was a retailer or a manufacturer.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 14 cmt. a (1997).
60. Id. § 402A(1). Further, the rule of strict liability applies to a seller even if "(a) the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller." Id. § 402A(2).
61. See id. § 402A.
62. See Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ill. 1982).
[Tihe apparent-manufacturer doctrine was developed in the context of suits by consum-
ers against sellers of dangerous chattels. . . . The aim of the doctrine clearly was to
provide a remedy for consumers injured by unsafe products. Today, of course, this
objective is achieved by the doctrine of strict products liability; all sellers of danger-
ously defective chattels are now strictly liable to injured purchasers-that is, they have
the same liability as the manufacturer-without regard to whether or not they held




proper plaintiffs brought within the ambit of the doctrine anyone who
would foreseeably use a product.
It is now widely accepted that a seller responsible for introducing
defective goods into the market and the manufacturer (the party best
able to inspect the goods and prevent their entry into the market)
should be held liable for injuries caused by the defects. 63 But what of
a trademark licensor that neither manufactures nor sells a defective
product? Pure trademark licensors bear resemblance to manufactur-
ers and sellers in that they participate in the stream of commerce to
the extent that they reap a benefit from licensing their marks. 64 Addi-
tionally, the quality-control requirements of the Lanham Act suggest
not only that licensors are in a position to ensure that products bear-
ing their marks are of a reliable quality, but also that they should be
required to do so. 6 5
Whether these similarities are sufficient to bring pure licensors
within the ambit of products liability is a question that courts have
wrestled with for the last century. Some courts have held that the
mere act of licensing a trademark brings a licensor within the ambit of
products liability; however, the majority of courts have held that in
order for products liability to attach to a licensor, the licensor must be
substantially involved in the process that brings the product to market.
1. Pure Trademark Licensors Liable as Apparent Manufacturers
A minority of courts have held that a pure licensor, regardless of its
participation in the design or manufacture of a defective product, is
liable under the doctrine of strict products liability.6 6 These courts
have expanded the apparent manufacturer doctrine by interpreting
the scope of Restatement (Second) § 400 to include pure licensors-
meaning that a pure licensor's control over design, manufacture, or
distribution is not a deciding factor in liability. Support for this inter-
pretation can be found in comment d of that section:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the actor puts
out the chattel as his own product. The actor puts out a chattel as
his own product .... where the actor appears to be the manufac-
63. See Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939, 945 (Ariz. 1990).
64. This Comment uses the term "pure trademark licensor" to refer to a trademark licensor
that has licensed its trademark for consideration but is not substantially involved in the design,
manufacture, or distribution of the product associated with that trademark.
65. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Penn. 1973); City
of Hartford v. Associated Constr. Co., 384 A.2d 390 (Conn. 1978); Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
389 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. 1979); Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134 (Penn. 1987).
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turer of the chattel. . . . [T]he actor frequently causes the chattel to
be used in reliance upon his care in making it . . . .67
Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc. is an often-cited case for the proposition
that pure licensors can be apparent manufacturers. There, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois expressly held that a pure licensor may be held
liable regardless of its lack of involvement in the design, manufacture,
or distribution of the product. 68 In Connelly, a motorist was injured
when a tire bearing Uniroyal's trademark failed.69 The tire was manu-
factured in Belgium by Uniroyal's wholly owned subsidiary.70 While
the court noted Uniroyal's substantial involvement in the production
of the tires, this discussion was limited only to the theory of vicarious
liability.71
To appreciate the strength of the Supreme Court of Illinois's appli-
cation of Restatement (Second) § 400 to trademark licensors, it is im-
portant to note that Uniroyal's involvement would easily have been
sufficient to qualify it as an apparent manufacturer under the majority
view. 72 In fact, the court noted that while Uniroyal's participation was
considerable, it was inapposite: "[W]e do not consider that such par-
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965).
68. See Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 163.
69. Id. at 157.
70. Id. at 161.
71. Id. at 161-62.
72. The court provided a detailed list of Uniroyal's involvement:
[A]t the time the tire in question was manufactured a wholly owned subsidiary of Uni-
royal owned approximately 95% . . . of the outstanding shares of (the manufacturer];
... Uniroyal granted [the manufacturer] the nonexclusive license to use its registered
trade name, "UNIROYAL"; . .. Uniroyal was to make available to [the manufacturer]
detailed information as to the methods, processes and formulas used in the manufac-
ture of tires and tubes and other products manufactured by Uniroyal. Also included
was a provision whereby Uniroyal would supply technical services and instruction to
[the manufacturer], including recommendations and assistance in purchasing equip-
ment, processes to improve operations, supplying of specifications, including testing
procedure, and information concerning the construction of the products covered by the
agreement, including "patterns and prints where necessary to describe constructions."
[The manufacturer] was free to send representatives to visit Uniroyal's plant and inves-
tigate manufacturing methods and processes and formulas used in those plants. The
agreement also provided for quarterly payments to Uniroyal and that [the manufac-
turer] "in its advertising . . . may publicize . . . the facts that in its manufacturing prac-
tices it practices and employs the manufacturing and technical methods used in the
United States by [Uniroyal] and that [the manufacturer] adopted these methods after
investigation and study of manufacturing and technical methods followed by manufac-
turers in the most promising and progressive." [The manufacturer] was required to
permit Uniroyal's representatives "to have knowledge at all times of the goods and
manufacturing operations . . . associated with its business identified with the trademark
and logo," and under certain conditions preference was to be accorded Uniroyal in [the
manufacturer's] purchases of materials produced by Uniroyal.
Id. at 161 (some alterations in original).
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ticipation is an essential element in order that the doctrine of strict
liability apply . . . . The fact that the defendant may not have been a
link in the chain of distribution is wholly irrelevant."73
The approach of the Connelly court has often been referred to as
the "stream of commerce" approach.74 This theory asserts that all en-
tities that are part of the producing and marketing enterprise respon-
sible for placing a defective good in the stream of commerce are
strictly liable for injuries caused by that product.75 The stream of
commerce approach allocates the cost-risk of injuries to those who
benefit from the sale of defective goods.76
The apparently broad scope of the Connelly decision was limited by
the Supreme Court of Illinois's later decision, Hebel v. Sherman
Equipment.77 In that case, an employee's foot became caught in the
conveyor belt of an automatic car wash.78 The car wash system-with
the exception of the defective conveyor belt-was manufactured and
assembled by Sherman Equipment, and the system as a whole bore
Sherman's trademark. 79 The appellate court found that Sherman
Equipment was an apparent manufacturer because a "reasonable per-
son in [the employee's] position would view the entire assemblage at
the ... car wash as one 'system' and would infer that Sherman Equip-
ment manufactured all of its 'component parts,' including the con-
veyor, and that this inference amounts to Sherman Equipment's
holding itself out as the conveyor's manufacturer."8 0
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court., In
doing so, it limited Connelly by requiring that there be some reliance
on the part of the consumer and that the defendant meet a threshold
level of participation in the stream of commerce. 82 The court rea-
soned that the apparent manufacturer doctrine requires actual reli-
73. Id. at 162-63.
74. See Arthur Schwartz, The Foreign Trademark Owner Living with American Products Lia-
bility Law, 12 N.C. J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 375, 377 (1987).
75. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322 (Ct. App. 1972).
It is the defendant's participatory connection, for his personal profit or other benefit,
with the injury-producing product and with the enterprise that created consumer de-
mand for and reliance upon the product (and not the defendant's legal relationship
(such as agency) with the manufacturer or other entities involved in the manufacturing-
marketing system) which calls for imposition of strict liability.
Id. at 323.
76. See Schwartz, supra note 74, at 377-78.
77. See Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199 (Ill. 1982).
78. Id. at 200.
79. Id. at 200-01.
80. Id. at 203.
81. Id. at 200.
82. Id. at 204-05.
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ance on the part of the consumer and "that whether a holding out has
occurred must be judged from the viewpoint of the purchasing pub-
lic."83 The court admitted that a casual observer may believe the en-
tire system to be manufactured by Sherman; however, it found that
the employer actually purchasing the equipment was a sophisticated
consumer and could not reasonably have relied on such an
impression.8 4
As for participation in the stream of commerce, the Hebel court
distinguished Connelly:
The basis for the imposition of strict liability in Connelly was the
defendant's integral involvement in the overall producing and mar-
keting enterprise that placed the dangerous product in the stream of
commerce, and its participation in the profits from the distribution
of the product.85
Sherman Equipment did not share the same level of involvement or
the same economic benefits as did Uniroyal in Connelly. Therefore,
the court held that characterizing Sherman Equipment as an apparent
manufacturer was without justification.8 6
2. Pure Trademark Licensors Not Liable as Apparent
Manufacturers
The majority of courts have required a certain amount of involve-
ment by a trademark licensor in the design, production, or distribution
of a defective product before attaching liability.87 These courts have
frequently relied on either Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400 or Re-
statement (Third) of Torts § 14.
a. The Pure Trademark Licensor Under Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 400: The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine
In Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Connecticut relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400 for the pro-
position that a trademark licensor cannot be liable as an apparent
manufacturer without substantial participation in the manufacture,
83. Hebel, 442 N.E.2d at 203.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 204. The Hebel court's distinguishing of Connelly is dubious. As discussed above,
the Connelly court expressly held that the level of Uniroyal's control was irrelevant to liability.
The discussion regarding Uniroyal's involvement was limited only to the issue of agency. See
supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
86. Hebel, 442 N.E.2d at 205.
87. See, e.g., Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997); Torres v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 867 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1988); Nelson v. Int'l Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1984); Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., 579 A.2d 26 (Conn. 1990).
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design, or distribution of the defective product.*8 In Burkert, consum-
ers sued a retailer of a transmission fluid that proved to be defective. 89
The retailer brought an indemnification action against Atlantic Coast
Oil and General Motors.90 The retailer had purchased the fluid from
Atlantic Coast Oil, and the fluid bore the trademarks of both Atlantic
Coast and General Motors.91 General Motors did not receive pay-
ment for the license of its trademark, did not control the fluid's pro-
duction, and did not inspect the fluid to ensure that it met General
Motors' specifications. 92 The court held that because of General Mo-
tors' limited involvement in the production, design, or distribution of
the fluid, it could not reasonably be characterized as a seller and was
therefore not an apparent manufacturer under Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 400.93
b. The Pure Trademark Licensor Under Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 14
The Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14, published in 1998, is derived
directly from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400.94 Besides largely
reifying the rule set out in its predecessor, comment d to § 14 specifi-
cally addresses the issue of whether a pure licensor should be held
liable as an apparent manufacturer:
The rule stated in this Section does not, by its terms, apply to the
owner of a trademark who licenses a manufacturer to place the li-
censor's trademark or logo on the manufacturer's product and dis-
tribute it as though manufactured by the licensor. In such a case,
even if purchasers of the product might assume that the trademark
owner was the manufacturer, the licensor does not "sell or dis-
tribute as its own a product manufactured by another." Thus, . . .
the licensor, who does not sell or otherwise distribute products, is
not liable under this Section of this Restatement.
Trademark licensors are liable for harm caused by defective prod-
ucts distributed under the licensor's trademark or logo when they
participate substantially in the design, manufacture, or distribution
of the licensee's products. In these circumstances they are treated
as sellers of the products bearing their trademarks. 95
88. See Burkert, 579 A.2d at 33.
89. Id. at 28.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 29.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 33.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS. PRODS. LIAB. § 14 cmt. a (1998).
95. Id. § 14 cmt. a ("The rule stated in this Section derives from § 400 of the Restatement,
Second, of Torts, promulgated in 1965.").
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As is readily apparent, comment d was drafted to address the con-
flict between courts over the issue of whether a pure licensor should
be considered an apparent manufacturer, a point noted by the Ap-
peals Court of Massachusetts in its recent opinion, Lou v. Otis Eleva-
tor Co. 96
Prior to Lou, Massachusetts had long recognized the apparent man-
ufacturer doctrine set forth in Restatement (Second) § 400.97 In
Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., for example, a retailer purchased
wood stain from the manufacturer and sold it to plaintiff.98 The wood
stain's can bore a label representing that the retailer had manufac-
tured it.99 When the consumer used the stain on her kitchen floor, it
ignited and severely burned her. 00 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that "[i]t is no justification that the [retailer] pro-
cured the stain instead of having it compounded on its own prem-
ises. . . . [A]nd its representations to the purchasing public or
consumer without any notice of its dangerous character that it was the
manufacturer must be taken as essentially true."1 01 Not only is Thorn-
hill in line with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400, but it actually
serves as the basis of an illustration provided in that section. 102
However, in Lou, Massachusetts joined the ranks of the majority by
limiting the application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine. In
96. See Lou v. Otis Elevator Co., 933 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
97. The Massachusetts legislature had codified products liability into its general laws:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action
brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods to recover damages
for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did
not purchase the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person whom the
manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, con-
sume or be affected by the goods.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2008); see also Lou, 933 N.E.2d at 146 ("Massachusetts rec-
ognizes the 'apparent manufacturer doctrine,' as originally set forth under the Second Restate-
ment § 400." (citing Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 108 N.E. 474 (Mass. 1915); Fahey v.
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 482 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985))).




102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1965).
A puts out under his own name a floor stain which is manufactured under a secret
formula by B, to whom A entrusts the selection of the formula. The stain made under
this formula is inflammable, as a competent maker of such articles would have known.
Of this both A and B are ignorant, and neither the advertisements nor the directions
contain any warning against using it near unguarded lights. C purchases from a retail
dealer a supply of this stain and while D, C's wife, is applying it to the floor of the
kitchen, C strikes a match to light the gas. An explosion follows, causing harm to D




contrast to Connecticut's adherence to the majority rule through reli-
ance on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400, the Lou court grounded
its position by officially adopting Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14.103
In October 1998, four-year-old Lou traveled to the People's Repub-
lic of China to visit his grandparents.104 While descending an escala-
tor in a department store, Lou's hand became caught between the
skirt panel and step tread.105 He was dragged down the escalator, and
his hand was almost completely severed at mid-palm, resulting in
"permanent thirty-one percent whole-body impairment." 1 0 6
China Tianjin Otis Elevator Co., Ltd. (CTOEC) manufactured the
escalator. 07 The company was formed in 1984 as the result of a joint
venture between Otis Elevator Co. and two Chinese corporations. 0 8
CTOEC manufactured and sold escalators within China under a
trademark license from Otis.109 In addition to the trademark license,
CTOEC was permitted the use of "Otis' Know-How" in the produc-
tion of escalators,1"0 which included Otis's manufacturing designs;
methods for the production, installation, maintenance, and testing of
the escalators; quality-control specifications; instructions on factory
management; instructions on the renovation of CTOEC's factories;
and assignment of personnel responsible for the management of the
factory."' Several key components of the escalator were manufac-
tured by Otis's wholly owned subsidiary in Germany.112
The litigation was a long and drawn out affair. Lou brought suit
against Otis in 1999, alleging both negligent design and strict liabil-
ity.1 3 At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury re-
garding Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14 comment d.114 The charge
was put to the jury along with a verdict slip questioning the jury (1)
whether "Otis was a manufacturer or apparent manufacturer of the
escalator" and (2) whether the escalator was "unreasonably danger-
ous as a result of being defectively manufactured or defectively de-
signed."11 5 The jury answered both questions in the affirmative and
103. Lou v. Otis Elevator Co., 933 N.E.2d 140, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 142-43.
107. Id. at 143.
108. Id.




113. Brief of Appellees at 2, Lou, 933 N.E.2d 140 (No. 2009-P-0632), 2009 WL 3816111.
114. Id. at 2-3.
115. Id. at 3-4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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returned a verdict for Lou of $3.35 million.116 Otis then appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts."r 7
In September 2010, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts held that
the apparent manufacturer doctrine, as set forth in § 14 of the Restate-
ment (Third), reflected the law of Massachusetts."i8 The court began
by noting the split between jurisdictions when applying the apparent
manufacturer doctrine under § 400 of the Restatement (Second).119
Then, taking into consideration the language of § 14 of the Restate-
ment (Third), it decided that the later Restatement represented a limi-
tation of the doctrine.120
The court acknowledged that § 400 and its accompanying comments
could be read to apply the doctrine to either a broad or narrow cate-
gory of licensors.121 It agreed with Otis that § 400, along with com-
ment a, restricts the scope of liable entities to those who supply the
product by sale, lease, gift, or loan.122 However, the court went on to
explain that comment d of § 400 supported a broader application by
including within the interpretation of "those who put out" licensors
that appear to be the manufacturer as a result of a consumer's reliance
on the trademark. 123
The court then discussed the different ways courts have applied the
broad reading and the narrow reading of § 400.124 The court grouped
these cases into three categories and posited that comment d of § 14
was intended to address the discrepancy between courts as to whether
a licensor is liable when there is no substantial involvement.125 Ac-
cording to the Lou court, comment d was designed to preclude appli-
cation of the doctrine where there is no substantial involvement, and
as such, it represented a limitation of the doctrine, not an
expansion.126
116. Id. at 4. An additional $3,295,327.46 of prejudgment interest was added, bringing the
total verdict to $6,645,327.46. Brief of Appellant at 9, Lou, 933 N.E.2d 140 (No. 2009-P-0632),
2009 WL 1934573. The prejudgment interest was one of the issues on appeal, and the appellate
court devoted a substantial portion of its opinion affirming the award. See Lou, 933 N.E.2d at
150-53.
117. Lou, 933 N.E.2d at 142.
118. Id. at 148.
119. Id. at 147.
120. Id. at 148.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 146-47.
123. Lou, 933 N.E.2d at 147.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 147-48.
126. Id. at 148.
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While acknowledging the persuasiveness of the Restatements, the
court declined to follow § 14 on that fact alone.127 Because Massachu-
setts had never applied the apparent manufacturer doctrine outside of
the distribution chain, the court relied instead on extra-jurisdictional
opinions, including the Supreme Court of Arizona's decision in Torres
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber CO.1 28
In Torres, a motorist was injured when the tread of one his tires
separated while he was driving.129 The tire was manufactured by a
wholly owned subsidiary of Goodyear and bore Goodyear's trade-
mark. 30 The Torres court found that Goodyear's ability to control
the manufacturer was "pervasive"'13 and that it shared in the profits
from sales of the tires.132 The court relied on these factors to charac-
terize Goodyear as an apparent manufacturer and, in colorful lan-
guage that the Lou court found particularly compelling, opined that
"[clertainly the brain that so competently and thoroughly directs the
entire enterprise must be liable for the acts of its appendages." 13 3
Finding Torres persuasive, the Lou court held that "the [trial] judge
correctly instructed the jury on Massachusetts law in accordance with
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 14 comment d."13 4
Over the last century, the conception of trademarks as property in-
capable of discrete alienation has relaxed to account for the changes
in our increasingly industrial economy. Similarly, the doctrine of strict
products liability developed to address the harms arising from our in-
dustrialization. As a matter of course, these two fields of developing
law have inevitably overlapped with inconsistent results.
III. ANALYSIS
Generally, there are two approaches for applying products liability
to a trademark licensor. The majority approach, adopted by the
American Law Institute through its promulgation of Restatement
127. Id. ("[W]e have never taken the position that this court should abdicate to the views of
the American Law Institute as set forth in its various Restatements." (quoting Bongaards v.
Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 348 (Mass. 2003)).
128. Id. (citing Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1990)). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Supreme Court of
Arizona, and the Supreme Court of Arizona refrained the question: "[I]s [a] trademark licensor
strictly liable for personal injuries caused by a defective product put into the stream of com-
merce by the trademark licensee?" Torres, 786 P.2d at 941.
129. Torres, 786 P.2d at 941.
130. Id. at 941-42.
131. Id. at 942.
132. Id. at 945.
133. Id.; see also Lou, 933 N.E.2d at 148-49.
134. Lou, 933 N.E.2d at 153.
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(Third) of Torts § 14 comment d, is to trademark licensor liable when
it "participate[s] substantially in the design, manufacture, or distribu-
tion of the licensee's products."135 The minority approach-the
stream of commerce approach-holds that a trademark licensor not
involved in either the chain of distribution or the manufacture of a
defective product may still be held strictly liable for its licensees' de-
fective products.
One logical approach to take when analyzing the implications of an
overlap between two seemingly discrete areas of law is to consider the
public policy underpinnings of each field and then decide whether a
particular approach to the overlap fulfills these objectives. Such an
analysis of the overlap between products liability and trademark li-
censing shows that pure trademark licensors should be held to the
same standards as sellers and manufacturers.
Two of the major policy concerns that support strict products liabil-
ity are the appropriate allocation of the costs of injuries and the pre-
vention of defective goods from entering the marketplace, both of
which are well served by the stream of commerce approach. The pri-
mary function of a trademark, as recognized by modern law, is to
serve as an indication of quality consistent with other goods bearing
that same mark. That function would only be reinforced, and thus
become more reliable, by applying the stream of commerce approach
to pure trademark licensors.
A. The Public Policy Underpinnings of Products Liability Support
the Application of Strict Products Liability to Pure Licensors
The appropriate allocation of cost is one of the most basic justifica-
tions behind strict products liability. The concept of placing the loss
caused by defective products on those who reap the benefits from cre-
ating the products is easily applicable to a trademark licensor that re-
ceives valuable consideration in exchange for the use of its mark.
Another common justification of strict products liability is that the
risk of strict liability attaching to sellers will result in those sellers
pressuring manufacturers to use the utmost caution in preventing de-
fective goods from entering the marketplace. There is no reason to
assume that a pure licensor is not able or willing to apply that same
pressure.
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 14 cmt. d (1998).
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1. Costs Should Be Allocated to Pure Trademark Licensors
"The major purpose of strict liability is to place the loss caused by
defective products on those who create the risk and reap the profit by
placing a defective product in the stream of commerce, regardless of
whether the defect resulted from the 'negligence' of the manufac-
turer."' 3 6 Putting aside those rare cases in which the trademark licen-
sor has received no benefit from the licensing of its mark,137 when
considering the allocation of the cost of injuries to a consumer among
those entities that profit from the sale of the products, it is hard to
argue that a trademark licensor should receive special treatment com-
pared to the manufacturer or seller.
While it is true that the licensor is different from the manufacturer
or seller insofar as it is not literally in the "chain" of manufacture and
distribution, such a narrow construction of "stream of commerce" is
unnecessary and seems to be a step backward in the evolution of strict
products liability. Frequently, the entire enterprise that introduces a
product, defective or not, into the stream of commerce is driven by
the licensing of the licensor's trademark. 38 Often, it is the value of
the mark, which is a corollary of the esteem with which the public
holds the mark, that spurs the sales of the product and makes the en-
terprise profitable-let alone economically feasible. 39
Further, even before states adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A, the traditional ideas of privity had been eliminated from this
area of law.140 Given the dissolution of the privity requirement and
the role of trademark licensing as a driving force behind the produc-
tion of goods, it is almost anachronistic to require a trademark licen-
sor to be an actual participant in the chain of commerce in order to
allocate the costs of injury to the licensor. After all, "strict liability
arises, not because of the [seller's] legal relationship with the manu-
facturer or with other entities in the manufacturing-marketing system,
but because of its 'participatory connection, . . . with the enterprise
that created consumer demand for and reliance upon the product."141
136. Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 163 (Ill. 1979) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 338 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ill. 1975)).
137. See, e.g., Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199, 205 (Ill. 1982).
138. See Note, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors, 55 IoWA L. REV. 693, 695 (1970) ("The
demand created for a product becomes associated with the mark which comes to represent a
particular quality product. The consumer then relies on his past associations with a trademarked
product in making his product selection.").
139. See id. at 695-96.
140. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.




The licensor is undoubtedly part of that enterprise when a product is
manufactured and sold bearing its trademark; the sales of the product
are amplified by the existence of the mark, and the trademark licensor
has received consideration for the use of its mark.
Finally, if the goal of strict products liability is to take the cost of
injuries away from an injured consumer and spread that cost among
those who have reaped the benefit and are likely better able to inter-
nalize that cost through pricing, it makes perfect sense to include the
licensor in the equation. It is reasonable to assume that the more par-
ties that bear the cost, the more efficiently that cost can be spread
among themselves. For example, the members of the enterprise can
contract for varying degrees of responsibility.
Strict liability is not attached to the manufacturer because it caused
the defect, and a seller is strictly liable despite the fact that it could not
have caused the defect; liability attaches to these entities due to the
role they play in bringing the product to market. It would be entirely
consistent with these considerations to hold a pure trademark licensor
to that same standard of liability.
2. Pure Trademark Licensors Can Play a Valuable Role in
Preventing Defective Goods from Entering the Marketplace
A second major justification for holding sellers of defective prod-
ucts strictly liable is their perceived ability to influence the conduct of
the manufacturer. Justice Traynor first explained this justification in
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.:
[T]he retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the
product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the man-
ufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus serves as an
added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and
retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff
142
Trademark licensing has become an enormous industry.143 Manu-
facturers are able to produce products bearing a well-known mark
with the knowledge that consumers, relying on that mark, will
purchase that product. In this way, the manufacturer does not need to
develop goodwill with the public and can instead license the goodwill
of the licensor. In this sense, a licensee depends on the licensor as a
crucial player in the enterprise. There is no reason to assume that a
licensor is not as able or as willing as a seller "to exert pressure on the
142. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1964).
143. See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of "Quality Control" in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57
AM. U. L. REv. 341, 343 (2007).
716 [Vol. 61:697
PURE CONFUSION
manufacturer" to ensure that the product is safe.144 In fact, a licensor
exposed to the possibility of strict liability would be more likely to
exert pressure on its licensees to ensure safe design and manufactur-
ing procedures.
B. The Primary Function of a Trademark as an Identification of
Quality Supports the Stream of Commerce Approach
Trademarks, originally viewed only as signifiers of origin, became
licensable only upon the reconstruction of trademarks as signifiers of
consistent quality.145 Now trademarks are viewed as "guaranteeing
that all products bearing the same mark share[ ] the same quality re-
gardless of the manufacturer."1 4 6 It is only with this conception that
trademarks are licensable.
As mentioned earlier, the Lanham Act places an affirmative duty
on trademark licensors to retain reasonable control of the licensee's
products. Whether the risk of forfeiture is effective depends on the
trademark owner's self-interest in its mark.147 However, this protec-
tion is only prospective as far as consumers are concerned: it aims to
prevent future confusion or misplaced reliance on the trademark. If a
licensor fails to control the quality of the products to which its trade-
mark is attached, the resulting forfeiture will not compensate the in-
jured consumer that purchased the product in reliance on the
trademark's ostensible guarantee of consistent quality. It seems un-
fair that a licensor can benefit economically by inducing consumers to
rely on its trademark as a sign of quality, yet not be held accountable
along with the manufacturer and seller when that reliance proves to
be misplaced. 148
Further, the prospective penalty of forfeiture is not a great risk.
Courts are disinclined to declare forfeiture absent extreme circum-
144. Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171.
145. Calboli, supra note 143, at 344.
146. Id.
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. c (1995).
148. See Note, supra note 138, at 699 ("The present state of the law [as of 1970], in which a
mark owner can step outside the scope of the products liability by entering a licensing agreement
while continuing to reap financial benefit at the consumer's expense, is indefensible in light of
the important role that trademarks play in the economy."); see also Deschamp, supra note 5, at
269 ("Presently, under the Lanham Trademark Act, licensors can license their trademarks to
numerous manufacturers, thus generating a greater amount of profit than if they only manufac-
tured products themselves. Licensors can also formulate their involvement with the product so
that they retain rights to the mark but not enough to warrant the imposition of liability. In this
situation, the system perpetuates a win-win situation for licensors who profit without potential
liability while consumer interests are sacrificed.").
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stances.149 In fact, in recent years "courts [have] progressively relaxed
the interpretation of the control that licensors must exercise over their
licensees and [have] held that first 'adequate,' then 'sufficient,' and
then 'minimal' control was sufficient to fulfill the statutory require-
ment."s5 o If the threat of forfeiture is not a true concern for a trade-
mark licensor, there is no real impetus, except for a likely de minimis
loss of goodwill, for it to influence the quality of the goods bearing its
mark.
The law of trademarks, and the right of exclusive use of a trade-
mark, is premised on the fact that consumers use those marks to assess
the quality, and often the safety, of the products they purchase. It is a
natural corollary that when a consumer purchases a product based on
a trademark's implicit guarantee of quality and that product proves to
be defective, thereby breaching that guarantee, the licensor who reaps
an economic benefit from placing that "guarantee" on the product
should be held accountable for that breach.15'
When the public policy justifications of products liability and trade-
mark law are considered individually, it becomes clear that the stream
of commerce approach to the strict products liability of trademark li-
censors is the appropriate approach. The cost-allocation and defect-
prevention goals of product liability are best served by the stream of
commerce approach. That theory also flows naturally from the foun-
dation of trademark law: trademarks are indicators of quality upon
which consumers rely.
IV. IMPACT
The stream of commerce approach is by no means a new theory.
However, not only is it the minority approach, it is also in danger of
finding itself without followers. For example, the Supreme Court of
Illinois, having clearly adopted the stream of commerce approach in
Connelly, seemed to distance itself from that approach in Hebel. It is
149. See Calboli, supra note 143, at 345-46.
150. Id. at 346.
151. As recognized by the Superior Court of Connecticut:
[TIhere is no reason why the strict tort liability analysis could not be expanded to in-
clude the licensor of a trademark. As an important factor in supplying goods, the
trademark owner is engaged in an activity in which experience dictates that some inju-
ries can be anticipated. If he were himself producing the product, it is likely that the
strict tort analysis would be applicable. It seems not to be in the public interest to allow
one to escape this responsibility through the simple maneuver of entering a licensing
agreement.
City of Hartford v. Associated Constr. Co., 384 A.2d 390, 397 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978) (alteration
in original) (quoting Note, supra note 138, at 706).
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not readily apparent why the stream of commerce approach should
find such disfavor. Several explanations seem likely: fear of excessive
litigation; hesitancy to attach strict products liability to additional cor-
porations; or reluctance to initiate a drastic change in the law.
Whatever the reason may be, courts continue to analyze the applica-
tion of products liability to trademark licensors under a negligence
framework. Put another way, courts tend to look to the licensor's in-
volvement rather than analyzing the situation from the standpoint of
the injured consumer. The problem with focusing on culpability
rather than reliance is best illustrated with a simple hypothetical.
Charles, a law student, is a big fan of Swifty, an athletic apparel
company. He has purchased Swifty brand shoes his entire life, and he
has always been satisfied with their quality. He also likes to wear
sweatshirts with Swifty's logo, the "Swifty Splat," across the front be-
cause he feels it gives him an athletic, sporty image. Swifty has spent
decades developing its brand by consistently producing quality foot-
wear and by spending billions of dollars on advertising. The Swifty
Splat is now its most valuable asset, an asset that generates immense
revenue not only by inducing customers to purchase Swifty products,
but also through multiple licensing agreements with various manufac-
turers, including Brella's, a small, family-owned umbrella manufac-
turer. Less than a century ago, Swifty would not have been able to
license its mark to Brella's; today, Swifty may generate revenue by
licensing the Splat logo to Brella's, and Brella's can pay to use Swifty's
Splat, confident that the Splat will help generate sales and that con-
sumers will be willing to pay even more for the umbrella merely be-
cause it bears the Splat.
One day, on his way to school, Charles gets stuck in a thunderstorm.
He ducks into Stuff-N-Sundries, a family-owned convenience store, to
wait out the rain. While inside Stuff-N-Sundries, Charles sees Brella's
umbrellas bearing the Swifty Splat. Excited about the find, Charles
pays for the umbrella and leaves for school confident that he will re-
main dry. When Charles arrives at the school library, he tries for sev-
eral minutes to close his new umbrella, but unfortunately it just will
not close. He gives it one more strong pull, and one of the ribs snaps,
rips through the fabric, and hits Amy, a fellow classmate, in the eye.
Less than one century ago, Amy, blind in one eye, would not have
had a claim against Brella's because she lacked the requisite privity.
Fortunately for Amy, the law has evolved to take into account the
realities of our society, and lack of privity is no longer a bar for her.
Similarly, less than one century ago, Amy would not have had a claim
against Stuff-N-Sundries not only because she lacked privity, but also
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because Stuff-N-Sundries was not negligent in the manufacture or de-
sign of the umbrella. Today, however, Amy has a valid claim against
Stuff-N-Sundries. Finally, less than one century ago, Amy would not
have been able to bring suit against Swifty because it was not a manu-
facturer or seller, nor was it substantially involved in the design, man-
ufacture, or distribution of the umbrella. Unfortunately for Amy,
under the majority approach, she is still unable to bring suit against
Swifty today. Swifty will not be held strictly liable.
A. The Stream of Commerce Approach Better Protects Consumers
This hypothetical illustrates the absurd result of the majority ap-
proach. Swifty is an enormous corporation with billions of dollars in
revenue. A substantial portion of that revenue is generated through
licensing deals just like the one in the hypothetical. Swifty's ability to
license its Splat mark is predicated on the assumption that Swifty will
control the production of the umbrella, thereby ensuring that
Charles's legislatively presumed reliance on the Splat as a sign of qual-
ity is not misplaced. Moreover, if it turns out that Brella's and Stuff-
N-Sundries are judgment-proof, insolvent, outside of a state's jurisdic-
tion, or otherwise immune, Amy will be left without a remedy.
1. The Stream of Commerce Approach Creates a Strong Incentive
for Licensors to Ensure that Products Bearing Their Mark
Are of High Quality
The majority position creates a legal reality in which Swifty's risk of
liability is directly proportional to the amount of quality control it ex-
erts over Brella's. It bears repeating that this control is obligatory
under the Lanham Act.152 By holding a licensor liable only when it is
substantially involved in the design, manufacture, or distribution of a
product, it necessarily follows that the more substantially Swifty is in-
volved, the more likely it will be held liable for any defective umbrel-
las. As it stands under the majority approach, the only economic
incentive for a licensor to insure that products bearing its marks are
free of defects is the protection of its goodwill and public image.
Conversely, holding Swifty to the same standard of liability as
Brella's and Stuff-N-Sundries would create a strong incentive for
Swifty to police the quality of the goods bearing the Splat mark.153 As
opposed to the aforementioned incentive to maintain its goodwill, the
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
153. See Franklyn, supra note 55, at 710 ("[S]ubjecting licensors to potential liability under the
apparent manufacturer doctrine would provide licensors with additional incentives to eliminate
the unsafe character of their licensees' goods.").
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specter of liability is a more readily quantifiable consideration that
licensors will be unable to easily disregard. Moreover, under current
law, licensors are already saddled with the obligation of policing the
quality of goods bearing their marks. Attaching strict liability to
Swifty when it shirks its legislatively imposed obligations cannot be
said to be an unfair outcome.
The above discussion highlights the inherent conflict between the
majority approach and trademark law. Trademark law requires a
trademark licensor to control the manufacture of goods bearing its
mark. The majority approach attaches strict products liability to that
same licensor upon a showing of substantial control. Thus, a trade-
mark licensor finds itself attempting to balance on a tightrope be-
tween trademark forfeiture and strict products liability. The stream of
commerce approach would eliminate this precarious balancing act by
holding the licensor liable regardless of control, while at the same
time encouraging that licensor to make greater efforts in insuring that
the manufacturer is not producing defective goods.
2. The Stream of Commerce Approach Allows Injured Consumers
a Remedy Where There May Otherwise Be No Relief
It is quite likely that Amy will be unable to identify who sold the
umbrella or, even more likely, who manufactured the umbrella. With-
out a defendant, Amy will be unable to bring a suit for damages. Hav-
ing seen the Splat on the umbrella, if there is one thing Amy knows
for certain, it is that Swifty played a role in the enterprise that brought
the defective umbrella into the marketplace. The stream of commerce
approach would allow Amy to bring suit directly against Swifty, thus
giving her an easily identifiable path to compensation.
Suppose further that Brella's is a foreign corporation without suffi-
cient contacts to bring it within the ambit of the forum state's jurisdic-
tion and that Stuff-N-Sundries is insolvent or otherwise judgment-
proof. The stream of commerce approach would allow Amy to bring
suit directly against Swifty, thus ensuring that she has a defendant ad-
equately situated to pay damages.
B. The Stream of Commerce Approach Promotes
Judicial Economy
One of the main problems of the majority approach is that it utilizes
the all-too-subjective "substantial" standard. While in some areas of
the law, subjective standards may be inescapable or even prefera-
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ble, 1 54 it makes little sense to remain tied to such a standard in the
present circumstance. Standards such as "substantial" or "reasona-
ble" are typically questions of fact to be decided by a jury.155 The
result is that issues that turn on such a finding of fact are irresolvable
at the early stages of litigation.
Holding trademark licensors to the same liability as manufacturers
and sellers injects a bright-line rule into products liability that will
make cases justiciable as a matter of law. While it is true that there
will usually be other questions of fact that must be found by a jury,
avoiding a jury decision on the meaning of "substantial" in a particu-
lar fact pattern will lighten the burden on the jury and the judicial
system as a whole. Further, parties will no longer be forced to spend
the time and money investigating and researching the question of
substantiality.
Finally, many products liability cases may turn on whether the de-
fendant was sufficiently involved to be held liable under the majority
approach. When the answer is unclear, parties are much more likely
to proceed to trial, dragging on litigation, perhaps through the appel-
late courts. Under the stream of commerce approach, those cases
would likely settle immediately. This would relieve a significant bur-
den on the courts and litigants, and more importantly, allow injured
consumers to find relief more quickly. A quicker resolution would
mean lower costs for a plaintiff.
C. The Stream of Commerce Approach Allows for
Self-Distribution of Liability
Any fear that the stream of commerce approach would result in
Swifty being unwilling to license its mark, thereby stifling Brella's abil-
ity to manufacture umbrellas and Stuff-N-Sundries ability to sell the
umbrellas, is misplaced. Swifty, Stuff-N-Sundries, and Brella's are
fully capable of, and likely will have, allocated the costs among them-
selves through their various licensing and sales agreements. Perhaps
the licensing agreement calls for Brella's to indemnify Swifty for dam-
ages arising out of defective products manufactured by Brella's that
bear the Swifty Splat. In this sense, the result of the lawsuit would be
the same if the jurisdiction subscribed to the majority approach.
154. See, e.g., Arroyo v. United States, 656 F.3d 663, 673-77 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J., con-
curring) (discussing both the necessity and limitations of the "reasonable man" standard).
155. See Edmund M. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Prelimi-
nary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REv. 165, 186 (1929) ("The accepted theory of jury trial
requires that there be submitted to the jury only matters in dispute as to which reasonable men.
could differ, and that in resolving the dispute the jury shall hear only legal evidence."). ,
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However, under the stream of commerce approach, Amy would have
an easily identifiable defendant; moreover, Brella's would be on no-
tice of its exposure to strict liability and would likely pay close atten-
tion to its design and manufacturing protocol in order to avoid
defective goods from entering the marketplace.
V. CONCLUSION
The inevitable overlap of trademark licensing and products liability
has left confusion in its wake. Unfortunately, the less preferable ap-
proach has taken the lead and appears to be gaining adherents, while
the stream of commerce approach shows signs of falling by the way-
side. Pure trademark licensors should be held to the same standard of
products liability as sellers and manufacturers. The justifications of
strict products liability apply just as readily to pure licensors as they
do to sellers and manufacturers. Trademark law mandates that licen-
sors exercise control over the products bearing their trademarks, and
yet the penalties for failing to control such products do nothing to
address any resulting injuries to consumers.
The courts have failed to find a unified theory of products liability
as applied to trademark licensors. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 400's apparent manufacturer doctrine is incapable of supporting
strict products liability for pure trademark licensors. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts § 14 expressly refuses to apply that liability. Despite
these failings, an examination of the doctrinal roots of trademark li-
censing and products liability inevitably leads to the conclusion that
trademark licensors should be held strictly liable for defective prod-
ucts bearing their trademarks. Perhaps the day will come when courts
realize that there is no sound reason in either logic or public policy for
treating licensors any differently than manufacturers or sellers of de-
fective goods.
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